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Patriotism, Pragmatism, and
Prostitution: Interplay of Class,
Political, Gender, and Medical Issues
in the Borderlands
JOy WIERSEMA

I met Sarita in the Conga, a house of prostitution in Nogales, Sonora,
Mexico. I This particular house of iII-repute boasted of a rather notorious .and prosperous past, and although the dub had seen better days,
one could still detect traces of its past elegance. A small, compact woman
of fifty-four, Sarita's seamless face belied her age. She ushered me into
her "room." Decorated in pretty pastels, with a candle-laden shrine to
the Virgin Mary blazing in one corner and the sounds of an American
television show emanating from the other, I entered Sarita's private room
at the back of the club and sat down on her bed-the only place available. Sarita proudly informed me that she no longer really "worked" at
the Conga. Instead, she tall ied up and dispensed the number of fichas
(tokens) each woman earned nightly. Tokens were issued to prostitutes
for various reasons, most importantly from customers who bought the
women drinks. Sarita explained that her job was really of the utmost
importance. Although she has worked in the Conga zona for much of her
adult life, Sarita hopes to retire within a year to spend time with her
family.2The following excerpt from an oral interview with Sarita illustrates how marginalized women involved in borderland prostitution can
reveal much about the state, international relations, issues of public
health, public morals, and dass relations.
J was the eldest of thirteen children born in Tapalpa. a pueblito
(little town) in Jalisco. Mexico.. in 1940. 1 moved to Guadalajara.
Mexico with my family when 1 was veryyoung. My parents did not have
much money. but J still managed to find enough time to meet my boyJoy Wiersema will received her MA in Latin American history from the University of Arizona, Tucson, in December 1995. She is currently working for Teach for
America as a fourth-grade bilingual instructor in the Rio Grande Valley.
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friend who later became my husband. Sadly, he died in a car accident
in 1961. 1 was three months pregnant at the time and when my husband
died 1 didn't want to think about anything, not even eating, 1 only
wanted to sleep. 1 thought life had no meaning. But when 1 had my
child 1 thought 1 had to continue living, for him and my family. After
delivering the baby, 1 moved in with my parents and spent three years
after my little boy s birth in my parent shame.
Then I came to Nogales, Sonora, after some friends ofmine told me
how much money I could make there. That was why a lot of women
came, because they knew someone who told them that they should come
and make lots of money. I worked in a woman s house for a while as a
servant but soon moved back to Guadalajara. In 1965 I returned to
Nogales because my family needed money and went to work in the
Mona Lisa, an elegant and popular cabaret. Atfirst I was very ashamed,
and would not even talk to anyone, but I soon gained confidence and
began to work as a prostitute. I left the Mona Lisa after only three
months when my son became very ill and had to have an operation. I
nursed him back to health and returned to the Mona Lisa in 1967. but
things were ve,:v different. A II the girls that worked there in 1965 got
along very well, but now they fought all the time over silly things; like
because they were drunk. Myoid patron a, Maria Bejarano, was a very
good woman. She protected us from disease, dressed us well and tried
very hard to please us. But she had diabetes, which had caused her to
become blind, and she died when 1 returned. Her husband sold everything, and so 1 moved to the Conga.
This place was really fancy and the patrona treated us very well,
plus the women did not fight with one another. We even had our own
private doctor who checked us every week to make sure we were healthy.
At the Mona Lisa we went to the same doctor as everyone else in the
zona. 1 never had any bad diseases, syphilis, gonorrhea. cancer, 1 never
had any of them. The doctor gave us injections and we had protection.
When a client came into our room we would say "Let me see su miembro
[your penis). .. If we saw something we did not like we did not take
their money. We had classes where the nurses showed us films about
what types ofsymptoms to lookfor in a man and how a woman feels who
has a disease. There was not an offiCial system to check out the men,
but my duefias [madams} always told me to do it. The money was always very good and I was able to send a lot ofmoney back to my family
and support my son. Around that time we made about three dollars and
fifty centsfor twenty minutes or twenty dollars per night. I worked with
all types ofwomen: Americans, Mexicans. Philippines Isic!. Japanese,
and our clients came from everywhere also. But we mostly had Americans and rich Mexicans.
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At that time the zona was very busy; every night the entire block
was filled with cars, and there were almost too many soldiers. Every
Wednesdaywe got a free day where we could go downtown to do our
shopping, otherwise we had to stay within the zona. We could bring
one bag and we had to turn that over to the police when we returned.
Some women dressed and acted improperly when they went shopping,
but 1 never did. 1 always dressed very decently and acted in a very
proper manner so 1 never had any problems. 1 think that was the best
way to be.
There was a lot ofoppression by the police, and they were very bad
to us; if they saw us in a restaurant they would talk to the patron and
make them pay a fine. You had to get permission from the police to do
everything: to go to the doctor, to go to the bank with the money, your
house, to see your children, for everything. Some women did not always follow these rules. We were' supposed to obey, but some women
found it easy to leave. But if the police saw them they gOI in trouble.
and then the patron had to come and pay money to get them out of
trouble. A lot of women met and married rich foreign men. One of my
friends, Cynthia, met a millionaire who was on vacation in Mexico.
She married him and moved back to Michigan. where she now has
children. Other women retired and lived in Nogales. In the past. people
may have criticized prostitution but those in the centro / center oftown}
more or less accepted us as we brought them a lot ofbusiness. Plus we
shopped there ourselves.
1 always have felt ashamed to be a prostitute; shame. much shame.
1 did not want to work as a prostitute, but then J always thought ofmy
family. My family needed money to go to school. to live. and so J continued working. J was the oldest and so J had to work to help out my
younger brothers and sisters; J made a lot of money. Now they are all
happy and have good jobs. So now that J don 1 have to worry about
them anymore 1 can quit this job and move into my house. Maybe I will
quit in a year or so. J
Sarita's history illustrates the rich and virtually untapped possibilities for the study of marginalized women involved in borderlands prostitution. Her story contains many classic elements of marginalization:
namely economic need, migration, matrilocal family structure, and strict
state regulation. Yet, in spite of the potential for investigation, few scholars have adequately examined the topic. This essay attempts to partially
close this gap in borderlands scholarship through an examination of
prostitution regulation. In particular, this study will focus upon Nogales,
Sonora, although information from other border cities will be included.
In a tourist-centered economy, oriented toward United States servicemen and foreign tourists, prostitutes formed an integral part of the
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borderlands economic community. Cabarets and other establishments
that employed prostitutes not only attracted outside business, but also
generated a considerable amount of municipal tax revenues and provided an important financial outlet for economically marginal women. 4
Ironically, in light of the integral role of prostitutes in the economy,
borderlands communities severely circumscribed their lives with strict
rules and regulations. Th~. rationale for the regulatory measures of the
borderlands zonas de to/erancia (circumscribed areas that permitted
prostitution) yields insights into broader topics, including diplomatic
relations and cooperation between the United States and Mexican governments, political infighting between local, state and federal governments, and issues of class, morality, and health.
The influence and actual drive behind the regulation of borderlands
prostitution cannot be traced to a single source. Various factors contributed to the debates surrounding the proper "handling" of prostitutes
and the business of prostitution. The situation of cities, such as Nogales,
located on the international boundary with the United States, posed a
special and most pecul iar situation. In the 1940s and 1950s, transborder
movement reached a peak. Many military personnel stationed in the border region spent their paychecks in Mexican border cities. The time soldiers and tourists spent in the zonas worried American officials concerned
about the spread of venereal disease. Thus, an exami nation into the
diplomatic measures employed to address this problem provides a unique
empirical avenue into United States-Mexico relations.
Initially, instead of closing down the border to deal with the control
of venereal disease. American officials regulated the behavior of their
own personnel and citizens. By the mid-1940s, authorities reached a
general consensus on border-crossing rules. Naval personnel from the
Eleventh Naval District, which encompassed much of the southwestern
United States from California to New Mexico, were permitted to spend
time in bordertowns in uniform with identification cards and passes signed
by the commanding officer. The ensefiada (border town region) included
any town within seventy-five miles of the international boundary. Military authorities limited such liberty to men of good conduct, and stipulated that they needed to remain circumspect in behavior during their
time in Mexico. Rules limited regular visits to one day only, not to begin
before 8:00 a.m. and not to exceed II :00 p.m. In order to further maintain
order, officials granted passes to no more than 5 percent of the enlisted
men at anyone time. j
Military authorities also restricted specific ports of entry for various reasons. In 1943, regulations prohibited naval personnel from enteringMexico through bordertowns in Arizona, New Mexico, and California's
Imperial Valley. This prohibition caused some confusion and agitation
as reflected in a letter Brigadier General Thoburn K. Brown sent to the

JOY WIERSEMA

403

commandant in 1943 that asked for clarification. He complained that many
naval personnel from Phoenix, Arizona, traveled to Nogales only to be
refused entry once they reached the border. General Brown's confusion
stemmed from the fact that the War Department permitted army personnel to visit Mexico inside ofa twenty-kilometer zone. In spite of Brown's
queries, by 1945 only Nogales, Sonora, remained on the prohibited list
for unspecified reasons. 6
In order to more specifically combat venereal contagion, military
authorities situated prophylaxis stations on the American side of
bordertowns. For example, in 1943 the military established a "Sanitary
and First Aid Station" in Tijuana for military and civilian personnel at
any time during the day or night. Commanding officers encouraged returning servicemen to take advantage of the available health services.
Many apparently heeded the advice of their superior officers as reports
on the use of border stations far outnumbered other stations established further away from the border. 7
By the late 1940s, venereal disease control along the border necessitated further action by American and Mexican officials. Monthly venereal disease control reports for the Eleventh Naval District regularly
cited Tijuana as the prime site of exposure and subsequent contagion
for military personnel. Any increases or decreases in the venereal disease rate attributable to Tijuana warranted the attention of the appropriate officials. The rise in venereal disease rates intensified border crossing
issues. Newspapers reported on periodic threats to close down the border in order to eliminate high incidents of venereal infection tracked
back to Tijuana. Reports in 1948 and 1949 indicate a tough stance from
American officials interested in cleaning up Tijuana. In January 1949,
Senator Harley M. Kilgore, a Democrat from West Virginia, visited the
Tijuana area and urged an investigation into the situation. He wrote to
Senator Millard Tydings, chair of the Armed Services Committee, "that
unless the incidence of venereal disease in Tijuana could be diminished
considerably, it might be advisable for the Armed Services Committee to
recommend to the Navy that it declare the Tijuana area off-limits to
Naval personnel."8 Other officials, such as Major General E.P. Parker,
Armed Forces Disciplinary Board chair, doubted that authorities would
accomplish anything without closing the border. He complained that a
Tijuana venereal disease investigation in June 1947 eventually proved
unsuccessful when the civil administration switched hands in November. After the change in Tijuana city government, the infection rate increased dramatically as over half of the new infection cases for the
Eleventh District had an origin traceable to Tijuana. Major General Parker
indicated that he did not expect, nor would he accept, a repeat perfor-
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mance in Tijuana. To support his recommendation, he cited a drop of 75
percent in new infection rates after the 1948 when Matamoros, Mexico
was deemed off limits to military perso~nel stationed in Texas. 9
In spite of the tough talk about closing the border, officials appeared
hesitant to completely shut it down as Commandant B.B. Bieri commented
that "closing the border to military personnel will attract undesirable
elements to San Diego and may result in conditions less desirable than
those which at present exist. There 'would be a definite increase in the
San Diego rate." In his opinion, closing the border to uniformed military
personnel would only cause the establishment of little shops renting
inexpensive civilian clothing for servicemen to use. 10 ,
Mexican officials had concerns of their own regarding the large numbers of American servicemen who visited the bordertowns. A 1948 report on the Mexican border cited seven and one~half disciplinary
infractions per week by military personnel in the Tijuana area. Most of
these infractions involved drunken and disorderly conduct that led to
rowdy, destructive, and insolent behavior. Offenses ranged from the case
of a WAVE (Women Appointed for Voluntary Emergency Service) arrested for being so inebriated as to not know who or where she was, to
a sailor arrested for an altercation with the Tijuana police in which he
broke the watch of one of the officers. Perhaps one of the worst cases
involved a sailor from the USS Mervine, arrested for assaulting a Mexican civilian and his pregnant wife; Apparently, he grabbed the woman
by her "privates" and struck her husband, cutting his forehead seriously. Abuse worked both ways, however, as in a 1944 case when American officials charged two Mexican policemen with excessive force against
a Marine private on leave in Mexicali. II
Before Senator Kilgore called .for a drastic cleanup, officials attempted to decrease the incidence of venereal infe,ction. In 1945, authorities from the border areas in both countries convened in EI Paso,
Texas and then Ciudad Juarez, Mexico at the United States-Mexico Border Public Health Association to discuss possible cooperative strategies to battle dangerous levels of venereal contagion. 12 A December
1946 letter from General lB. Oldendorf, the commandant of the Eleventh
Naval District, to General Juan Felipe Rico, the commandant of the Second Military Zone of Mexico, aptly demonstrates the mutual respect,
cooperation, and non-confrontational relationship that exhibited between some borderlands officials. Oldendorf wrote:
We have made ,a great deal of progress in our controls of liquor
sales both in San Diego and Tijuana.... However, there still
exists the age-old problem of venereal disease control, and again
as military men, I am sure you and I will find a common means of
solving this problem in behalf of our people.... I would greatly
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appreciate your study of the matter and will welcome from you
any suggestion that will counter a situation which threatens to
force me into an action I would deeply regret-that of having to
prohibit general visiting in Tijuana by personnel of the Navy
and Marine Corps. I feel that our years of practical military experience permit me to frankly discuss the situation which is giving
me deepest concern: ... I appreciate that you and your civil
leaders also are aware ofthe need for some urgent corrective·to
halt the spread of the dread disease menacing our respective
people.... I await your suggestions, with the knowledge that,
together, we again can defeat a common enemy. 13
By 1948, the United States Central Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board passed along suggestions for the elimination ofthe venereal
contagion threat posed by the bordertowns.Plans were in the works for
a joint American-Mexican action that would involve not only officials,
but business and civic organizations in order to ensure the success of
the endeavor. Within a year, the United States Department of State and
the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, represented by Dr. Joseph A. Spoto
and Dr. JohnR. Murdock, arranged with Dr. I. Morones, Mexico's director of health, for a visit to those Mexican border cities viewed as sources.
of venereal infection for military personnel. Tijuana was on their list of
suspects as officials from the United States Health Service; the
Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, and Mexico's Health Department visited this city and Mexicali on 21 January 1949. 14
Despite increased pressure on and public criticism of American diplomats, military officials refrained from declaring the bordertowns "out
of bounds." Senator Kilgore claimed that Commandant Bieri's inaction
regarding the matter of venereal disease control in Tijuana prompted his
transfer to the United Nations Security Council in New York, and Kilgore
praised the swift actions of the Secretary of the Navy in the matter.
Kilgore's smug accusations sparked tempers in the border region, however, as Captain Ross A. Dierdof, the public information officer of the
Eleventh Naval District, commented: "It's a shame that the career of one
of the finest men I've ever known has to be slurred by a politician not fit
for the Admiral towip.e his shoes on."IS
Nevertheless, border. officials c~ntinued their cooperative efforts,
partly because of a presidentiarinjunction to all Mexican governors of
border states to enforce the regulations and. laws regarding prostitution. In a conference with the Department of State and Admiral Louis
Denfeld, the Chief of Naval OperatiQOs; American officials deCided that
perhaps the best means of influencing Mexican authorities was to invite.
them to the monthly mee'tings of the Armecl Forces Disciplinary ControlBoard in San Diego. Here, Mexican offiCials:would have the opportunity
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to witness the effective cooperation of this board with the American
public to control venereal disease. The State Department hoped that
after a few meetings a discussion of the problem in Tijuana could be
tactfully addressed. The American consul in Tijuana, Waldo Bailey, delivered invitations to the Mexican consul, Tijuana's police chief, and
city health officials in the interest of discussing "mutual problems" of
"mutual interest." 16 Thereafter, these officials established the "Tijuana
Project for Control along the U.S.-Mexico-border area" effective the
first of September 1949.
The border project involved the cooperation of the United States
Public Health Service, the army and navy medical services, the California State Health Department, and the federal and territorial authorities of
Mexico in order to improve the "conditions associated with flagrant prostitution and allied vice in the border area ... [to] benefit not only naval
personnel, but the citizens of the United States and Mexico as well."17
Although efforts in the United States to combat venereal disease involved a complete suppression of prostitution, the Tijuana project had
slightly different aims. Officials hoped to better regulate prostitution in
order to eliminate potential contagion danger. Reports demonstrated a
marked improvement, but problems still existed as only 55 percent of all
prostitutes routinely visited the Tijuana clinic, in spite of continued
efforts by border officials. Nevertheless, the program continued into the
1950s after a two-year progress report favorably gauged the overall
success of the project. A commandant personally recommended the continued cooperation of the program when a dramatic decrease in venereal
infection rates traceable to Tijuana was reported. Rates decreased from
a high of 15.5 per thousand in 1949 to 11.9 per thousand in 1951. 18
For some officials in the United States the successful results of the
Tijuana project did not come quickly enough. Senator Kilgore demanded
that the border be closed, so a hurried agreement between the United
States military and State Department, Public Health Service,
Pan-American Sanitary Bureau, and the Mexican Minister ofHealth could
be reached. The agreement stipulated the following: the Mexican government would support venereal disease control programs throughout
the border region; the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau would assume the
supervision of these programs; the same bureau would implement a plan
of action; and, Mexican law enforcement agencies would support the
agreed-upon medical controls.
The influence of this agreement throughout the borderlands is difficult to gauge. In Sonora, the effects may be viewed through meetings,
held in Nogales, Arizona beginning in 1955, of the United States-Mexico
Border Public Health Association to discuss venereal contagion contro1. 19
Moreover, relations between local officials in Nogales, Arizona and
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Nogales, Sonora also exhibited a similar spirit of cooperation like their
counterparts in Tijuana and California. Louis Sotomayor, chief of police
in Nogales, Arizona during the.l940s and 1950s, commented on the "closeness" of the police forces in the Ambos (both) Nogales communities.
This allowed for the elimination of "red tape," and Sotomayor attributed
the relatively "trouble-free" Arizona side in part to these close ties, but
also to the booming business in prostitution on the Sonoran side as he
commented:
We were on a first name basis with the police department over
there. . . . We needed them and they needed us. . . . If you
wanted to keep law and order you needed each other's cooperation. Mexico does not have an extradition pact ... they will not
turn over one of their people.... They [prostitutes] couldn't
compete over here.... They used to brag that we had no prostitution and' took credit for it because we had such good law
enforcement units ... nah, they just couldn't compete;20
In the United States, officials opted to completely suppress all prostitution in order to better protect the military and civil populations. This
strategy did not solve the problem in the borderlands, however, where
military authorities had to deal with prostitution in Mexico as well as the
United States. Nonetheless, border officials from both Mexico and the
United States displayed a very practical approach to the problems prostitution posed. Neither an imposition of American values, nor a blatant
disregard by Mexican officials for the concerns and needs of American
authorities accounted for prostitution control. Instead, border authori~
ties opted for the employment of a cooperative spirit to battle what they
considered a common enemy.
The influence American officials exerted concerning the control of
venereal disease in the United States coincided with similar concerns in
Mexico and affected the regulatory legislation passed throughout the
1940s and 1950s. Along with the economic development of northern
Mexico, border cities, including Nogales, embarked on ambitious city
beautification and morally edifying "projects" to encourage modernity
and order in their fledgling communities. Within this program, prostitution became a "contested terrain," and the regulation of women's bodies
in Mexico served as a "stage" where various federal, state, and local
struggles were played out. In Nogales, two "phases" of prostitution
control can be determined, although a great deal of overlap occurred.
First, in the early- and mid-1940s, a rhetoric of repression, couched in
patriotic terms and espoused by federal and state officials, replaced a
previous policy of pragmatic regulation. By the 1950s, however, a more
pragmatic approach again gained salience, although it was accompanied
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by renewed efforts to clean up the border with definite moralistic and
.class overtones. In both phases, a conflict between rhetoric and reality
existed, and the prostitute stood as a symbol of revilement, as a "problem" to be fixed either through repression or regulation.
In the early 1940s, Sonoran legislators embarked upon an ambitious
plan to make Sonoran cities better for those belonging to una vida
civilizada (a civilized life), and their attention once again turned to prostitution. By the mid"":twentieth century, Mexican federal law did not prohibit prostitution, a situation that caused tremendous variance in the
organization of centros de vicio (centers of vice). Yet, as early as 1930,
the Sonoran Codigo Sanitario (Sanitation Code) delineated the boundaries of the commercial prostitution area (zona). Many other cities possessed a zona. Typically, sanitation authorities established the areas by
prohibiting cabarets in downtown districts or within 500 meters of
schools, churches, or public walkways. Article 389 of the 1930 Sonoran
code prohibited prostitutes from attending churches, theaters, or walking in public areas where they could be easily identified. Furthermore, a
meretrice (prostitute) diagnosed with a venereal disease was interned at
a hospital until her "cure" or until the doctor permitted her departure. 21
Another 1930 law the state legislature passed, Ley que Aprueba e/
Reg/amento de Prostituci6n (Law that Approves the Regulation of Prostitution), augmented the C6digo Sanitario. The statute demanded that
all female prostitutes submit to medical exams, registration, and civic
regulation. After a medical exam, prostitutes received "patents" to work,
which they were required to carry at all times. In order to continue working, every registered prostitute had to submit to health inspections every Saturday. In addition, prostitutes were not permitted to live outside
the zona, to leave the area and mix with the general populace, or to have
minors of either sex in the bordellos, even their own children. 22
These regulations and restrictions circumscribing the lives of the
prostitutes may have achieved particular salience distinguishing between
the middle- and upper-classes, the gente decente (the respectable
people), and the lower classes, but not necessarily prostitutes. For example, women could be defined as prostitutes if they frequented cabarets or lived in one, acted in a publicly licentious manner, or if they
contracted a venereal disease while unmarried. Clearly, these distinctions gave officials significant leeway in defining who was a prostitute,
and it is almost certain that abuse occurred.
A 1940 revision of the federal C6digo Sanitario indicated a change
in policy as the new legislation specifically targeted anti-venereal disease reform. Dr. Enrique Villela of the Mexican federal health department
recorded the new anti-venereal legislation and provided commentary
and helpful solutions to the problem of prostitution. Although not prohibited, prostitution was considered undesirable as Villela cited statis-
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tics that indicated a 95 percent venereal infection rate for all prostitutes.
Thus, the law targeted prostitution as a "dangerous" and "anti-social"
activity; officials subsequently believed they needed to reduce the number of prostitutes. In spite of the abolitionist rhetoric, the new legislation included prostitutes in its program. They were still required to submit
to medical exams and regulation as public health depended, in large part,
on the success of the anti-venereal disease campaign reforms within
the prostitute population. 23
Amendments to the Codigo Penal (penal code) also exhibited a more
abolitionist tone. Article 199 reflected the perceived threat posed by
venereal infection by defining venereal contagion as a part of Delito de
Lesiones, or crimes of physical harm or damage. The article penalized
any infected person who knowingly endangered the health of another
individual by engaging in sexual relations. Denoted as a particularly
heinous crime because it endangered not only the individual but also
the "biological soundness" of the race, a conviction included up to
three years in prison and a fine of up to $3,000 pesos. The law generally
exempted married people unless one spouse filed a complaint. This nueva
moraJidad (new morality) intended to eliminate much of the danger of
contagion through reforms directed toward organized, commercial prostitution. 24
A patriotic rhetoric of repression soon replaced these
semi-pragmatic policies as matters relating to national defense obfuscated the larger issues of public health and venereal disease control.
With the onset of World War II, President Manuel Avila Camacho issued
several presidential decrees dealing with matters pertaining to national
and civil defense. In June 1942, the president suspended certain constitutional rights for as long as Mexico remained in a state of war with
Germany, Italy, and Japan. Article four of this decree reserved the right
to impose on all departments of the Public Administration any modifications necessary for the effective defense of national territory and the
maintenance of fundamental institutions. In September, President
Camacho mobilized all sectors of the civil population and took the necessary measures to guarantee maximum production and to centralize
defense under government-designated civil defense authorities. 25
The regulation of prostitution fell under the scrutiny offederal officials, and President Camacho issued a letter to all state governors in
September 1942, urging the closure of all zonas in Sonora. Camacho
charged that prostitution caused inefficiency in the military and civilian
populations, that it served as the main medium for disseminating venereal disease, and that vice centers often became focal points for dangerous activities and bases for subversive or disloyal elements. In the
interest of self-defense, Camacho asked that each state government
begin a campaign of education and repression of prostitution. He pro-
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posed to completely close the zonas and end periodic medical exams.
The president demanded the cooperation of federal, state, territorial,
and municipal authorities to ensure the accomplishment ofthese goals,
and he held up the program in Ciudad Juarez as an exemplar for all to
follow. 26
Tired of the problems that accompanied a zona, Ciudad Juarez officials began their Campana contra la Prostituci6n y las Enfermadades
Venereas (Campaign Against Prostitution and Venereal Disease) in 1942
in conjunction with the United States and the Washington, D.C.-based
Pan-American Sanitary Office. Local authorities attributed their initial
ideas to "European nations, advanced in culture and human civilization
[who] after arriving at the end of very serious studies and experiments
of all classes arrived at the conclusion that the zones of tolerance, established since time immemorial, were useless for controlling these diseases. "27 In light of what they and President Camacho viewed as a very
successful and complete repression of prostitution, Ciudad Juarez authorities referred to their efforts as a guide for others to follow, or "the
torch that you carry in your hands, will be a guide not only for Ciudad
Juarez and EI Paso, Texas, United States of North America, but for all the
nation."28
In response to these presidential injunctions, Governor Anselmo
Valenzuela of Sonora stated his firm belief in the importance of eradicating prostitution centers, and he mentioned that his state had been working toward the abolition of laws regulating prostitution. Governor
Valenzuela transmitted the president's injunctions to all municipal presidents with explicit instructions to implement the necessary measures to
put the president's orders into practice. In 1943, the new Sonoran governor, General Abelardo L. Rodriguez, "cheerfully" offered the maximum
collaboration of all officials from the state of Sonora in achieving the
"highest efficacy in repressing prostitution. "29
Although the governors heartily endorsed and attempted to implement the ambitious prostitution repression program, evidence from the
municipality of Nogales suggests that local officials, cabaret owners,
and prostitutes did not heed the president's injunctions. Newspapers
frequently reported on the continued existence of the zona and complained about the blatant disregard local authorities had for the orders
of the governor. The governor ordered the closure of Sonora's zonas in
late 1942, but several articles in 1943 and 1944 cited robberies in the
district and complained about the establishment of EI Tivoli, reportedly
a house of prostitution located between a school and a hospitapO Other
articles bluntly attacked the conduct of city officials. Perhaps in an attempt to shame local authorities into action, a 1943 article printed the
names of those officials who ignored the law and singled out the cabarets and the names of their owners who offered the services of prosti-
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tutes in overt disregard for the presidential decree and gubernatorial
orders. 31
The most bombastic and sarcastic article directly indicted local officials for their hypocrisy. The press continued to receive numerous reports from city officials that the zona did not exist, in spite of the
numerous robberies and other incidents in the brothels, suggesting it
continued to exist. Perhaps to quell criticism, an agent of the Public
Ministry staged a raid of the zona, but the raid uncovered no evidence
of prostitution. Furthermore, the dueiias of those establishments involved in the raids signed a deposition certifying that the raids did
occur and that they had no future intentions of violating the law in their
establishments. In response to these staged raids and authoritative insistence that the zona did not exist, a reporter wryly commented: "It has
been more than 300 years since Galileo proposed that the Earth moved
and the Sun was the center of our planetary system. An ignorant tribunal passed down a sentence of heresy and negated the scientific theory
established by Copernicus, another great wise one, and nevertheless
the Earth continued to move, notwithstanding that the official truth
would change the order of the planetary system. "32
With the beginning of the post-war period, the prostitute debate
shifted away from the impractical repression rhetoric to a more pragmatic policy designed to "protect" the community from possible moral
and physiological contagion. A broader nationwide fight against vice
figured into these debates. A 1954 newspaper article detailed the renewed efforts to fight against vice in order to protect the family, "the
nerve of the nation." The national program, according to the president
of the campaign, Ignacio Martin del Campo, aimed to mobilize all sectors
of society to attain the "ambitious" and "noble" goal.)) The prostitute,
as a symbol ofrevilement, assumed an even more salient position as the
people of Nogales, with more moralistic than patriotic overtones, intensified their efforts to "clean up" their city, to rid the community of the
danger of venereal disease, and to further define the line of demarcation
between the gente decente and those of the lower classes-particularly,
but not exclusively, prostitutes.
The 1955 C6digo Penal for the state of Sonora reflected the more
pragmatic attitude toward prostitution and emphasized a need to protect
the precarious morality of some components of society. Unlike the federal code of 1940, which distinctly specified the particulars of this crime
in the interest ofrepressing organizedprostitution, the new 1955 state
code defined lenocinio (pandering) more broadly to include anyone who
exploited the body of a woman for comerc;o carnal (prostitution). Significantly, the state legislature placed the law under the rubric of Delitos
contra 10 Moral Publica y las Buenos Costumbres (crimes against public morality and good customs). Those who exploited the bodies of mi-
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nors received stiffer punishments of six months to two years in prison,
plus a hefty fine. An authority figure who exploited a minor under their
protection lost the right to patria potestad (parental guardianship) for
ten years and received a prison sentence ranging from one to eight
years. 34
Federal amendments to the C6digo Sanitario in 1950 and 1955 reflected an interest in protecting the health ofthe people of Mexico and
the influence of the United States, through the establishment of clear
guidelines to protect against the transmission of diseases by persons
entering Mexico through the ports of entry. The 1950 code designated
the establishment of sanitary services in air, land, and water entries in
order to ensure the protection of national territory from infections and
transmitted between humans or from other countries. Although many of
these measures aimed to combat non-venereal diseases, Article 117
specifically provided for the regulation of prostitution and for venereal
disease prevention. 35 In the 1955 revisions, federal authorities approved
even more specific regulatory measures to halt the debilitating effects of
venereal infections. In places where there was a "normal danger" of
endemic disease (they specifically cited the inhabitants of the zona),
participants needed to pay sanitation authorities a fee to construct and
support health service facilities. 36
Interviews with local residents indicate that officials in Nogales instituted some laws that specifically "protected" the population from
prostitutes and that further defined the demarcation between the general populace and the prostitute population. For example, throughout
the 1950s, local authorities permitted prostitutes to leave the zona only
one day per week (Wednesday) to shop, see a movie, or spend time with
their children. According to local inhabitants, "good" mothers kept their
children inside when prostitutes walked the city streets, and residents
also avoided the movie theaters on these days so they would not have
to mingle with the potentially dangerous prostitutes. 37
Even more significantly, municipal health records indicate that by
1953 prostitutes received weekly injections of penicillin. This service
was similar to border prophylaxis stations that provided penicillin tablets to soldiers and tourists after sexual exposure. In the United States,
however, the authorities did not require men to take these tablets, whereas
prostitutes in Nogales had to submit to the injections or risk losing their
licenses. Furthermore, they were assumed to be contaminated, and one
should note that the state, which disallowed for others to intervene in
women's bodies, seemed to reserve this honor for itself through the
forced weekly injections of all prostitutes.
The continuance of the zona did not escape the critical eye of citizens concerned with the moral and physical well-being of Nogales. In a
1953 letter to the press, Dr. Francisco Arriola Gandara, chief of the Health
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and Assistance Unit in Nogales, defended what he considered an unfair
attack in several local newspapers, including el Acci6n Diario
lndependiente; He defended the regulation of the zona and attributed
this to the radical reduction of the venereal infection rate from 75-80
percent in 1950 to a reality in 1953 of only 3 percent. Furthermore, none
of the services came out of municipal coffers, due to the formation of a
Comite Auxiliar de la Profilaxis de las Enfermadades (Auxiliary Committee for the Prevention of Disease). Cabaret, cantina, and salon de
baile (dance hall) owners who housed prostitutes in their establishments financially supported the committee. In Gandara's viewpoint, the
abolition of prostitution in Nogales (and numerous other cities in Sonora)
could not be accomplished quickly, and one needed to recognize prostitution in order to "battle her" and the concomitant threat of venereal
contagion. 38
Perhaps·because of the severity and gravity of prostitution regulations, officials who abused their authority and attempted to live outside
of the laws regarding prostitution and general moral decency particularly outraged the citizens of Nogales. An incident on 18 April 1960 at a
local restaurant scandalized the community and galvanized the press
into a scathing indictment of lax and abusive officials. Two families had
hoped to eat a restful meal at the restaurant when the city chief ofinvestigations, Francisco Soltero, entered with a meretriz (prostitute),who
was both inebriated and in "undignified positions." The reporter took
ample opportunity to describe the scene and his indignation: "Drunk,
with that posture, language and manners appropriate toa stupid person,
with the complex of an 'important authority,' Soltero was demonstrating
clearly just what is his personality."39 The reporter extended Soltero's
behavior to include nearly all the municipal authorities who brought
infamy upon Nogales through their inappropriate behavior. In addition,
incidents like this greatly damaged family tourism: "Unfortunately for
Nogales," ajournalist wrote, "there is no hope that there will be a change,
on the contrary ... the tolerance will remain because [the administration] has not wanted to become a good administration because each
member ... is an insult to good customs, the security of the families, and
the real concept of the citizens. "40
The issue of repression versus regulation achieved particular relevance during World War II, when patriotic, riationalist concerns dictated a policy of repression. Reality often diverged from rhetoric,
. however, and by the 1950s the impracticality of repression, evidenced
by local officials' disregard for federal and state policy, had been replaced by a more pragmatic policy of regulation. Running throughout
both "phases" was a Nogales community attempt to present a "modern"
facade, one informed by issues of morality and definite fears about the
possible danger cifvenereal contagion. The outright regulation of pros-
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titution from the mid-1940s and into the 1950s resulted in the crystallization of the image of borderland prostitutes as symbols of revilement in
the community: an ironic and unfair position considering their centrality
to the economic health of Nogales.
An examination of the regulatory measures employed~to regulate
prostitution in the borderlands illustrates broader discourses involving
the state, inter-nation relations, medical, class, and moral concerns.
American officials perceived unregulated prostitutes in the Mexican
bordertowns as a direct threat to the health of American citizens and
enlisted personnel alike. Their concern translated into action in the 1940s
and 1950s as a part ofa larger struggle to battle venereal disease. Officials in Washington, D.C. favored a harsh stance that involved completely closing the border, but, on a local level, diplomacy and cooperation
characterized the tactics employed by authorities from both sides of the
border to battle the "common enemy." United States-Mexico relations
directly impinged upon the actual regulatory measures passed in state
and federal legislatures. Issues of class, morality, and public health forced
prostitution control to the forefront of the debate over the borderlands
zonas de tolerancia. Initially, federal and state officials favored repressive tactics to completely eliminate prostitution and used patriotic, nationalistic language to buttress their arguments. Local officials in
Nogales, although they outwardly acquiesced to the wishes of the state
and federal governments, in reality largely ignored the calls for repressive actions. Subsequently, by the late 1940s and in the 1950s, officials
returned to a more pragmatic approach to prostitution control. The prostitute, within a program to "clean up" bordertowns such as Nogales, had
by then become a symbol of revilement and disease. Both legislative
and locally-imposed regulations reflected the perceived need to protect
the community from prostitutes by severely limiting and curtailing their
lives. The story of Sarita, the prostitute who lived in Nogales during the
1960s, poignantly illustrates the inequitability of many of these regulations. As a widowed, migrant, female head-of-household, Sarita felt the
pressure of economic necessity and frustration at not being able to find
ajob that covered her expenses. Thus, she turned to prostitution, a life
that gave her economic viability in Nogales. Ironically, instead of applauding, or at least understanding her actions, officials exercised their
power to circumscribe her existence, control her body, and assign her a
tangible position of shame in society.
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